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Abstract:
 
Rarely does one come across critical analysis which looks at islands as the strategic and
candid promoters of a role as political and economic usufructuaries over external resources. This
paper is premised on the proposition that a small territory is especially obliged to use extra-territorial
resources as its hinterland for economic success. Such resources extend over a whole range of goods
and services and include access to investment, welfare, security, stable currency, international
relations, specialised labour power, transfers, markets and higher education. The MIRAB syndrome
is one way of articulating this condition. This paper proposes a second cluster of features that are,
or can be, deployed by small territories in a manner somewhat different from MIRAB; this second
cluster has a more proactive policy orientation and a disposition towards carving out procedural
and jurisdictional powers. It is thus proposed to consider a small territory’s engagement with the
external hinterland as a position on a sliding scale, a strategic mix of options located between two
distinct development trajectories, of which MIRAB is one and the PROFIT model the other.
 
Keywords:
 
economic development
 
, 
 
hinterland
 
, 
 
MIRAB
 
, 
 
PROFIT syndrome
 
, 
 
small island
 
squalid settlement at Belize and intruded
deeply upon the social psyche of its inhabit-
ants. (Green, 1984)
 
Of course, population density, much like
smallness or insularity, does not cause any-
thing. It is a condition, not an attribute. There
may be, however, something going on here
that is worth reﬂecting on. Does the existence
of a ‘vast primeval forest’ impact on the social
psyche of a population? Would the absence of
any such forest impact as well? And if so
how?
The comparative study of small islands con-
fronts us with observations similar to Green’s.
Discarding the speciﬁc nuances of personali-
ties, history, climate, time and space, these
observations suggest that the availability, or
absence, of such a feature as a forest, or
some other immense domestic natural endow-
ment, can have a critical and determining
effect on human behaviour generally, and on
economic growth and development strategy
speciﬁcally.
Writing in 1984, economic historian William
Green regarded population density as a princi-
pal factor determining the nature of labour rela-
tions in the post-emancipation Caribbean. High
population density on a small and insular land
area, he argued, led to the non-availability of
plots of land for private use by emancipated
slaves; the latter thus had little choice but to
seek employment on plantations. Moreover, the
colonial presence was ‘sometimes intimate, and
always weighty’ (Green, 1984: 114). These con-
ditions were not conducive to the development
of an independent peasantry. Barbados pre-
sented the most extreme example:
 
[It] had almost no forest: it was fully cultivated,
riﬂed with roads, and bestrewn with villages,
stone churches, windmills and factories.
 
Along with other island territories such as St
Kitts or Antigua, in Barbados:
 
. . . there was no sense whatever of the vast
primeval forest that extended beyond the tiny
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Effects of absence of a local hinterland
 
Various arguments drawn from a number of
social science disciplines suggest that the
absence of a natural domestic endowment is an
intervening variable in the development of a
territory.
Helen Hintjens, a Réunion-born political sci-
entist, observes this much in relation to France’s
erstwhile colonies in the Indian Ocean. These
islands became inhabited only at the time of the
European Age of Discovery. Thus, the settlers
were the natives in the Mascaregnes, and there
was hardly any tension with indigeneity. With
relatively small land areas and high population
densities, the locals found no objection, and no
alternative, to remaining culturally incorporated
within the metropolitan regime. They had ‘vir-
tually no physical or cultural hinterland to
retreat to’ (Hintjens, 1991: 38). Assimilation
(after Miles, 1986: 198–206) was well nigh total
and complete. In spite of its limited administra-
tive presence in the region, the cultural hege-
mony of France in the broad Indian Ocean has
remained vibrant (e.g. Houbert, 1986).
Australia-based demographers Caldwell, Har-
rison and Quiggin, back in 1980, had already
come to the conclusion that insular microstates
are more ‘westernised’ (Caldwel 
 
et al
 
., 1980:
960). ‘They were part of the European maritime
system at a time when the West did not have
the economic strength to penetrate continental
areas to the same extent’ (Caldwel 
 
et al
 
., 1980:
953). Their ‘westernisation’ is measurable: a
higher propensity to migrate to developed
countries; in the late 1970’s, 85% were predom-
inantly Christian; 91% had an ofﬁcial European
language; 87% had a majority of the population
able to speak either a European or a Creole
language (Caldwel 
 
et al
 
., 1980: 954).
For British economist Paul Streeten, the
absence of a local rural hinterland has pivotal
signiﬁcance to economic development. It
exempts a territory from a dependence on ‘the
slow-coach of agriculture’ (Streeten, 1993:
199). In the case of small, densely populated
territories starved of land – such as the city-
states of Singapore, Hong Kong, Bermuda and
Malta – industrialisation or tertiarisation have
been the inevitable growth poles, obliging a
quick shift of mind-frame towards export pro-
motion and the penetration of export markets.
Absence of a hinterland also inhibits the forma-
tion of a land-owning peasantry or plantocracy
which can become a formidable lobby in
domestic and regional politics, seeking protec-
tion from cheaper imports and contributing to
higher costs of food items to consumers.
A forest, jungle, desert, swamp or a mountain
range, is often seen as (i) an outback, far from
the centres of habitation and urbanisation; (ii) a
place of refuge, escape, or of a ‘fall back’,
defensive or regrouping position in times of war
or pursuit; as well as (iii) a reservoir, fount or
stock of diverse reinvigorating supplies and
resources – physical ones such as agricultural
produce, land or lumber; but also less tangible
assets such as ancestral culture, spiritual
refreshment, health, composure, inspiration or
crude energy.
I shall, in this paper, be referring to such
places, real or imaginary, as hinterlands. I ﬁnd
the word apt because it synthesises all three
senses of outlyingness, refuge and potential. It
is the term already used by Hintjens and
Streeten in their assessment of the development
trajectories of small island territories. It is a term
used readily in human geography to represent
an outlying service centre feeding a metropoli-
tan area, often acting as its ‘living space’ (Crack-
nell, 1967): it is a relationship in which demand
originates in one location but is satisﬁed in
another (Greer and Wall, 1982: 227). The
absence of an interior, a local hinterland or a
local terrestrial core area is a small island char-
acteristic recognised also by the United Nations
(Grifﬁth and Inniss, 1992).
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 It would be very
difﬁcult to imagine Robinson Crusoe without
the opportunity to make thirteen trips to his
wrecked ship (Hymer, 1971: 17).
The concept of a hinterland also connects
easily with other, perhaps more current, terms.
Take that of a ‘footprint’, often applied to ecol-
ogy (e.g. Gössling 
 
et al
 
., 2002): it appears that,
 
ceteris paribus
 
, the smaller the territory and the
higher the population density of its inhabitants,
the more likely is it that its footprint extends
beyond its shores. Extending the argument to
the more familiar, although fuzzier, concept of
‘sustainability’, one could contend that, as far
as small islands are concerned, ‘speaking of
sustainable development is a contradiction-
in-terms’ (Connell, 1988a; Bertram, 1993;
Baldacchino, 2004: 6) because the small local-
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insular would not survive without drawing in
resources and assets from, while ﬂushing out
excesses and undesirables to, a hinterland
beyond.
Turning to the vulnerability thesis (Briguglio,
1995), the model is faulty precisely for assum-
ing closed, autonomous systems: adopting a
territorial, closed system or statist perspective
leads one to conclude that many such states
survive only on the basis of ‘artiﬁcial props’
(Briguglio, 1995: 1622). Parasitism remains a
bad word (Baldacchino, 1993) and is looked
upon with ‘scorn’ (Poirine, 1998: 65). Develop-
ment qualiﬁes as non-sustainable because it is
not underpinned by productive activity within
the territorial boundaries of the island econ-
omy (Bertram, 1993: 248). Rather, islands,
smaller islands in particular, must exhibit a
generous degree of openness and integration
with the outside world in order to survive (Ber-
tram and Watters, 1986: 52; Baldacchino,
2000). So, by way of example, the handling of
the aftermath to the Montserrat volcanic erup-
tions in the 1990s would have been a very
different story were the small colony a closed
system; not beneﬁtting from external support,
and particularly without the intervention of the
UK.
It therefore does appear that a crucial distinc-
tion in the evolution of societies and economies
has to do with the perceived availability or oth-
erwise of a local hinterland. I have included the
word ‘perceived’ because, where human beings
are concerned, there is no hard-and-fast direct
relationship between physical conditions and
human behaviour. It was thus easier for Sin-
gapore to develop an export orientation psycho-
logically since it had prospered with Malaysia
as its hinterland until independence in 1965.
Easter Island/Rapa Nui has become the classic
example of a now extinct community which
perhaps ended up consuming itself because, in
the face of obvious constraints on ﬁnite material
resources, it failed to recognise the option, or
to develop the required technology, to expand
beyond its shores. Although extreme population
densities (low – as in Pitcairn, or high – as in
Singapore) could endanger people’s lives and
access to resources, it is also clear that many
societies survive fairly well in what may be
seen by others as simply unbearable extreme
circumstances.
 
2
 
Politico-economic behaviour of 
small territories
 
These arguments, of course, are not new. They
have been taken forward and elaborated upon
to explain the political and economic behaviour
of small territories.
Thus, Caldwell 
 
et al
 
. state that: ‘on the
whole, they [that is, island microstates]
retained colonial links longer’ (Caldwell 
 
et al
 
.,
1980: 960). This is also afﬁrmed by Doumenge
(1989: 51). Few, if any, struggled for indepen-
dence; most have waged intense diplomatic
struggles to maintain or extend benign colonial
links with their overseas hinterland; at times
going so far as to press for integration, the very
antithesis of sovereignty (Guillebaud, 1976;
Winchester, 1985; Baldacchino, 1997: 176–
177). An intriguing mathematical relationship
presents itself in political geography, whereby,
in the post-World War II period, the larger,
mainland colonies struggled and obtained
independence ﬁrst – with the largest extant
(mainland) colony India being the ﬁrst to do so
traumatically in 1947. Meanwhile, the smaller,
mainly island, colonies have either obtained
political independence last, or else continue
to stubbornly refuse to shift gear from their
current, non-sovereign status. There are at
least 41 examples of the latter, and the num-
bers are not falling (Royle, 1989: 108). Predic-
tions that such places as Montserrat, Aruba,
New Caledonia, Greenland and the French
overseas departments would become indepen-
dent by the early 1990s have been proved
incorrect (Sutton, 1987: 5).
In the realm of economics, Kakazu (1994) has
suggested that such small territories be looked
upon as harbouring rentier economies, offering
their strategic location, investment potential,
ﬁshing rights, tax differentials or tourism prod-
ucts to attract ‘rents’ based on productive value
added generated (in hinterlands) overseas. Such
policies, where successful, have tended to see
a shift from productive status to rentier status,
and even stronger/deeper integration with met-
ropolitan powers and their economic cycles.
When accompanied by the abandonment of
what little commercial agriculture or ﬁshing
may have been possible, the shift becomes one
‘from subsistence toward subsidy’ (Connell,
1991: 271).
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In this case, domestic industrialisation is not
induced by the winding down of the primary
sector, but rather summarily skipped (Miles,
1986: 158; Baldacchino, 1998). Small territo-
ries ﬁnd themselves in the post-industrial era,
without the scars and polluting effects of an
industrial past, enjoying high levels of afﬂuence
and consumption predicated on an unorthodox,
possibly shifting, combination of resources.
These include remittances from ‘transnational
corporations of kin’ (Marcus, 1981); bilateral
and multilateral aid; public sector employment
and contracts; philately, conch shells, interna-
tional dial-up codes and Internet domain
names/sites (Prasad, 2004).
The common basis to the above arguments is
that they suggest novel departures from more
standard conceptualisations of development
where the engagement with the hinterland falls
under the rubric of less signiﬁcant, marginal
affairs. The stark truth of various small, mainly
island, jurisdictions today is that they thrive
mainly on such external relations.
The MIRAB model (Bertram and Watters,
1985, 1986) is today arguably the most popular
acronym for explaining this condition –
although its popularity may be less widespread
than is sometimes supposed.
 
3
 
 The key hypothe-
sis states that: ‘[T]here is today a class of econ-
omies and societies in which the combined
effect of migration, remittances, aid and
bureaucracy . . . determines [rather than sup-
ports] the evolution of the system’ (Bertram and
Watters, 1985: 497; emphasis in original). The
notion of ‘autonomous economic growth’ in
speciﬁc contexts is simply ‘false’ (Watters, 1987:
33). In spite of a number of suggested alterations
(MIRAGE by H.C. Brookﬁeld, 1986, quoted in
Connell, 1988a: 81; MURAB by Munro, 1990;
MIRTAB by Ogden, 1993; TouRAB by Guthunz
and Von Krosigk, 1996), the MIRAB concept
remains steadfast and, perhaps, has even as-
sumed of late the stature of a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy, especially in the South Paciﬁc. It is
not only a welfare-maximising strategy in line
with the theory of competitive advantage
(Poirine, 1998: 91); it now may, or may be
seen to, legitimise, justify and lock-in such an
economic development strategy in the long term
(Treadgold, 1999). As long as sources of revenue
remain secure, and as long as the shifting for-
tunes of any such ‘external’ source is adequately
compensated for by any other similar ‘external’
source, existing or new, then that is, in practice,
all that really matters – an unorthodox but ef-
fective sense of sustainability and entrepreneur-
ship (Bertram and Watters, 1985: 512; Bertram,
1993: 257).
Is this a case of 
 
plus ça change, plus c’est la
même chose
 
? The MIRAB cluster reveals itself
as a standard ‘development’ tactic to peripheral
regions and territories the world over. In cases
where there are metropolitan cores and stag-
nant peripheries – and where aren’t there? – the
MIRAB cluster of features constitutes the classic
response to assuage the ailments of those on the
edge, particularly if accompanied by a domi-
nant ideology of professed redistribution and
equalisation – that is, unless the central power
‘is prepared to see living standards slide’ (Ber-
tram and Watters, 1985: 513). After all, the stan-
dard measures used by the core to support the
periphery include an element of workfare (read
bureaucracy within MIRAB) and transfer pay-
ments (read aid within MIRAB); meanwhile,
migration, internal this time, is also likely from
the periphery to the centre, as people – partic-
ularly the young, the skilled, the educated, the
ambitious – search for work and a still better
education, occasionally visiting relatives back
home or sending them gifts in cash/kind every
so often (read migration in MIRAB). The novelty
of MIRAB, other than the fancy yet meaningless
acronym, lies in identifying uncannily similar
patterns operating between states, and not just
within them.
The MIRAB allure is quite remarkable. It
seems that, having named the beast of the apoc-
alypse, there is now no restraining its trium-
phant imperial project. When it was conceived,
Bertram and Watters applied the syndrome pri-
marily to just ﬁve small, Paciﬁc microterritories,
two of which were recently independent states
(Kiribati, Tuvalu); and the rest semi-autonomous
sub-national jurisdictions (Cook Islands, Niue,
Tokelau). In a MIRAB 
 
+
 
 12 paper, (Bertram,
1999), Western Samoa (now Samoa), Tonga,
French Polynesia, Federated States of Microne-
sia, other small US-associated Paciﬁc Territories
and Rapa Nui, as well as the outlying islands of
so-called ‘non-MIRAB’ island states, like Fiji,
Papua New Guinea and Solomons, were added
to the pioneering ﬁve, or noted to have been
added by other researchers. By 1998, the US
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Virgin Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint
Helena, St Pierre et Miquelon and Mayotte are
added to the list from beyond the Paciﬁc basin
(Poirine, 1998). McElroy and Morris (2002)
identify and conﬁrm four African island states
as MIRABs: Cape Verde, Comoros, Mayotte, São
Tomé and Principe. We have been told that ‘all
SPINs [South Paciﬁc Island Nations] match to a
greater or lesser degree the model of rent-
dependent MIRAB’ (Fleming, 2002: 6). Connell
(1991: 252, 270) had argued that the model is
applicable, to a greater or lesser extent, to most
small island countries, because most of these
have moved ‘from subsistence to subsidy’ (Con-
nell, 1991). It is not just the economic system
described, but the model itself, which appears
to be durable and persistent.
Yet, is this really the case? Has MIRAB unwit-
tingly become a convenient development para-
digm that dismisses alternatives? If MIRAB has
real explanatory value, this does not necessarily
mean that it is the only measure of small island
development. There may be alternative small
island development syndromes, as distinct from
conventional resource-based development
models as MIRAB, at work among small island
territories today. There may be, in other words,
non-MIRAB, pre-MIRAB and/or post-MIRAB
strategies for engaging with the hinterland
beyond. Any such different combination of fac-
tors is, like MIRAB, as much at home in the
realm of sub-national as of national/sovereign
island jurisdictions. To appreciate this alterna-
tive, the reasons why many, mainly island, small
territories have not opted for political sover-
eignty merit being reviewed. The dynamics
between the semi-autonomous territory and the
larger, sovereign state (and often former colo-
nial power) are uncannily similar to the pur-
ported advantages of a MIRAB strategy.
McElroy and Mahoney (1999) explain how
political afﬁliation continues to grant substantial
economic advantages to small, non-sovereign,
island units. These beneﬁts include: free trade
with, and export preference from, the parent
country; social welfare assistance; ready access
to external capital through special tax conces-
sions; availability of external labour markets
through migration; aid-ﬁnanced infrastructure
and communications; higher quality health and
educational systems; natural disaster relief; and
provision of costly external defence. Autonomy
without sovereignty also does not hinder the
development of ﬂourishing tourism economies,
and may actually facilitate them because of eas-
ier terms of access and security. Most of these
special conditions have emerged in the context
of a history of a relatively benign colonial rela-
tionship – typically one which was dominated
by strategic rather than economically exploit-
ative interests.
Meanwhile, a fair dose of jurisdictional clout
inhibits any concerted drive for political inde-
pendence. Many small islands, because they
are islands, enjoy some degree of administrative
autonomy (Baldacchino, 2000), also as an
unwitting beneﬁt of colonialism. This same fea-
ture lies behind the credentials for, and eventual
transition of small islands to, statehood. Further-
more, because they are also small, sparsely
populated and/or somewhat isolated or unique,
such island jurisdictions usually manage to
extract some special advantages from their
respective metropole. Although they may have
refrained from sovereignty, they would never-
theless, jurisdictionally or constitutionally, typi-
cally enjoy more discretionary powers than any
similarly sized or even larger chunks of the
‘mainland’ (Poirine, 1998). Thus, the indepen-
dence candle for islands may appear snuffed, at
least for the moment, and in spite of any nation-
alist aspirations (e.g. Trompf, 1993: xxv). Mean-
while, the current status of autonomy without
sovereignty is seen as the best of both worlds –
providing many of the beneﬁts associated with
political sovereignty while delegating responsi-
bilities, enjoying security and reaping the mate-
rial beneﬁts of remaining in association with a
larger, and typically richer, albeit often reluc-
tant, patron.
Smallness of population and/or land area, iso-
lation and islandness can act in concert to fuel
a distinctive territorial politics while safeguard-
ing and differentiating it from external ‘interven-
tion’. These departures are not exceptional: it
would be wiser to see them as examples of the
carving out of political niches where geography
facilitates, while at the same time circum-
scribes, the territorial scope of any achieved/
granted powers and privileges. More than that,
these are also examples of alterations in geo-
economic space. As economic power is trans-
ferred ‘upward, downward and outward from
nation states’ (Courchene, 1995: 3), jurisdiction
 50
 
© 2006 Victoria University of Wellington
 
G. Baldacchino 
 
is increasingly recognised as a very useful driver
and primer for such purposes. It becomes the
‘catapult’ which allows the entertaining of dif-
ferentiation within the local state, as well as of
developing an international (or better, an ultra-
national) presence on the global or regional
stage (e.g. McKercher, 2000).
The beneﬁts resulting from the extraction and
deployment of jurisdictional power call for
increased recognition (Baldacchino and Milne,
2000). They usually translate into a larger local-
isation of control over economic and political
decisions. Of course, the apex of jurisdictional
powers – powers far greater in relation to the
small size of a land mass or resident population
– has been achieved and assiduously cultivated
especially by sovereign small, often island
states: the ﬁsheries policy in Iceland; banking
policy in Luxembourg and Liechtenstein; sus-
tainable tourism policy in the Maldives and the
Seychelles; and a globally competitive textile
and garments industry in Mauritius. But the
political economy of success is even clearer
among non-sovereign island territories. Discre-
tion over taxation and offshore ﬁnance has been
behind the success of such territories as
Madeira, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Turks
and Caicos, the Isle of Man and the Channel
Islands; discretion over language policy, ship-
ping registration and property ownership lie at
the heart of the Åland Islands autonomy from
Finland; and some jurisdictional autonomy of
varying degrees is enjoyed by island provinces
of larger states, in spite of the usually small
relative size of land and population (Barbuda,
Gozo, Hong Kong, Kinmen, Nevis, Zanzibar,
the status apparte of Aruba, the 
 
departements
d’outre mer
 
 of France, French Polynesia,
Labuan, New Caledonia, Svalbard, Hainan,
Galapagos, Rapa Nui, Tasmania, the Balearics,
the Canaries, the Azores . . .).
What we have here is a combination of free-
riding by the smaller, island party in the context
of (at times deliberate) oversight by the larger,
metropolitan party, crafting in the outcome
some kind of regulatory legitimacy, while the
island faction never completely relinquishes the
potential resort to the metropole, if and when
dire straits so determine or suggest (such as
budgetary shortfalls; environmental disasters;
over-population; labour surpluses or shortages).
In this way, they avoid that chronic vulnerability
which results from systemic closure and which
is supposed to plague small, island territories
most of all (Briguglio, 1995).
The key difference between these strategies
and those falling within the MIRAB rubric is that
the former are based on jurisdictional discretion,
meaning the ability to adapt local laws and
regulations to suit the requirements of the micro-
insular economy, even if these laws and regula-
tions differ from those of the metropole in which
the small territory ﬁnds itself politically incor-
porated. Neither (out)migration, remittances,
aid nor bureaucracy need depend on differential
constitutionalism. Of course, a critical question
to ask is whether any such departures from the
norm are actually indicators of autonomy, or
merely manipulations driven and controlled by
the central state to its own net advantage, often
without any consultation or power-sharing
arrangements with the island locals.
 
4
 
However, and following critical observation,
utilising jurisdiction as a resource is one way of
compensating for the dearth of conventional
economic assets (Baldacchino and Milne,
2000). It is another shrewd survival strategy
based on a speciﬁc form of international rela-
tions: deploying a ﬂexible and creative diplo-
macy, adopting free riding (in such matters as
international relations, defence and security as
well as currency issues), slipping free or through
the nets of regulation and/or cultivating special,
ultra-national, economic linkages. All these
measures constitute a skill repertoire that the
small and powerless deploy and, being small,
often get away with. They may, in the process,
also be providing useful regulatory escape
routes for their metropolitan patrons, as perhaps
best illustrated by offshore ﬁnance regimes.
Such is the character of the dynamics of
unequal dyads, or unequal federalist arrange-
ments (Watts, 2000).
Sub-national jurisdictions may be tempted in
the near future to carve out policy discretion on
a speciﬁc number of areas, and economic rela-
tionships with a speciﬁc clutch of attractive
metropoles, in their favour. As the nation state,
already in itself a mythical construction of
modernity, ﬁnds itself too big as well as too
small to address key political problems (Bell,
1987), the pressures for internal devolution and
internal federalism in the contemporary ‘frag-
megrative’ space (Rosenau, 2003) will increase,
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just as the incentive for supra- and ultra-national
agreements with other neighbouring states or
components thereof will also. It is likely that, as
in the case of Malta and Mauritius 40 years ago,
political sovereignty as a fully-ﬂedged state will
only be seriously entertained, or threatened
with some degree of bluff, if what is considered
a better deal by the smaller player is absolutely
unacceptable to the larger.
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 The same political
contest is bound to occur at a supra-national
and regional level, as nations jockey to main-
tain policy autonomy while recognising that
‘pooled sovereignty’ is the only way forward to
render such bodies as the European Union (EU)
even more effective. The EU and the euro exist
in the ﬁrst place as the outcome of such a sober
assessment. ‘Government’ (meaning decision-
making by elected representatives) thus gives
way irrevocably to ‘governance’, meaning
decision-making by a plurality of networked
partnerships (Rosenau, 2003).
A second observation concerns the ﬁnancial
dimensions of development. Conventional eco-
nomic statistics rank countries according to
gross national/domestic product or purchasing
power parity standards. Wealth is often deﬁned
in such terms as GNP/GDP/PPS per capita.
Small, often island, territories are doing excep-
tionally well on these counts. In their powerful
critique of the alleged structural vulnerability of
many small (often island) territories, Armstrong
and Read (2002) conclude that smaller jurisdic-
tions actually perform economically better than
larger states. Comparative research has shown
that, on average, non-sovereign island territories
tend to be richer per capita than sovereign ones
(Poirine, 1998; Bertram, 2004). The citizens of
French Polynesia, Aruba, Bermuda and Iceland
are counted among the world’s top ten richest
people (
 
The Economist
 
, 2003). That the ﬁrst
three of the above four territories are non-
sovereign states is insightful; but, moreover, only
the ﬁrst can be considered a MIRAB-like econ-
omy. Stopping short of full independence, while
negotiating access to spoils within a larger juris-
dictional framework, appears to pay off. Yet, is
jurisdictional clout only there for the purpose of
extracting more largesse from the core?
Alan Fox (1969), a British industrial relations
scholar, divides the spoils of the production
relationship between ‘manager’ and ‘managed’
into two categories. He called the ﬁrst ‘substan-
tive rewards’ (meaning tangible results like
wages, hours of work or allowances) and the
second ‘procedural rewards’ (meaning proces-
sual details like who gets to decide on a pro-
motion, or how workers are dismissed). It
appears that MIRAB emphasises the substantive
gains – the ‘what’ – to a small economy (at both
macro and micro levels), but dismisses or
downplays the procedural ones – the ‘how’. A
second approach may treat the procedural goals
as the priority, with the substantive results com-
ing in eventually ‘downstream’ as it were, as
a consequence of the shrewd use of policy
capacity.
 
Creative political economy: Five capacities
 
Armstrong and Read (1998: 13) have argued that
many very small states – most of which are
island or archipelagic territories – have managed
to compensate effectively for their small size by
ensuring a high quality of ‘endogenous policy
formulation and implementation’. They also
contend that ‘further investigation of the policy
stance of successful microstates, particularly in
the sphere of international political economy, is
likely to be fruitful’ (Armstrong and Read 1998;
my emphasis). Earlier, Katzenstein (1985) had
made similar remarks in relation to small Euro-
pean states. Such insightful observations can
apply equally well to sub-national consider-
ations, and not just to international relations.
Island-based and island-biased literature sug-
gests ﬁve policy areas as being most likely to
fall within the remit of self-rule; as being looked
upon by many sub-national island authorities/
spokespersons as policy concerns which they
would most prefer to have under local control;
and as being critical ingredients in shaping eco-
nomic prosperity (e.g. Milne, 2000). Contesta-
tion over ‘who does what’ in these policy areas
has also been typically tense, especially in fed-
eral political systems, and may in itself lead to
demands for more self-rule, its withdrawal or its
renegotiation between the parties concerned.
These powers are, like the MIRAB quartet, pre-
mised on effective governance; however, unlike
the MIRAB quartet, they depend much more on
the proactive nurturing of speciﬁc, local, juris-
dictional capacities or local powers. They com-
prise the management of external relations but,
unlike MIRAB, this is done ‘. . . by means of
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domestic policies and governing institutions’
(Warrington, 1998: 101). Each of these selected
ﬁve policy areas is brieﬂy elaborated upon
below.
 
Powers over ﬁnance, mainly banking, insurance 
and taxation
 
Most offshore ﬁnance centres are located on
small island territories: out of 54 jurisdictions
listed on a ‘low tax’ website, 27 are islands or
archipelagos.
 
6
 
 This is because the latter habitu-
ally involve few signiﬁcant domestic transac-
tions, draw in ‘rent’-based surpluses from
elsewhere and are therefore not unduly trou-
bled by low tax policies (Baldacchino and Fabri,
1999: 141; Kakazu, 1994). Hampton and
Abbott (1999b: 7) argue that locating offshore
ﬁnance centres on small islands helps to place
the industry more closely within government
approval and thus increase investor conﬁdence.
Smallness and insularity may however precipi-
tate a ‘capture of the local state’ by international
ﬁnancial capital, such as international banks
and large accountancy ﬁrms (Christensen and
Hampton, 1999) as well as not-so-respectable
operations (Royle, 2001: 180). The Group of
Seven (G7) Task Force’s published blacklist of
15 territories where money laundering was
allegedly taking place included 10 island loca-
tions (G7 Financial Action Task Force on
Money-Laundering, 2000). Successful ﬁnance
centres in small economies also tend to ‘crowd
out’ pre-existing industries (such as agriculture
or small-scale manufacturing), leading to
increases in the price of property and skilled
labour. This is the condition of such island ter-
ritories as the Channel Islands (Hampton, 1994)
and Madeira (Milne, 2000: 17–18).
Baldacchino and Milne (2000: 232) consider
the power to tax, and tax differently, as critical
to economic prosperity. An exceedingly low tax
environment – via low corporate taxes and
business rates, generous capital allowances,
absence of capital gains tax, wealth tax, capital
transfer tax, inheritance tax, death or estate
duties, along with low personal income tax
rates (15–20%) – goes a long way towards
attracting both manufacturing and service
industries (Baldacchino and Milne, 2000). Such
a clutch of ﬁscal powers, with the backdrop
backing of a large reliable ‘patron’ state, under-
lies the success of the Isle of Man (McKercher,
2000) or Labuan in Malaysia (Abbott, 2000).
Locating international (offshore) ﬁnance cen-
tres, banks and insurance companies on (low/
no-tax) islands as enclaves of larger states
allows for a reaping of the beneﬁts of the indus-
try while containing the associated costs.
 
Powers over environmental policy, particularly 
natural resources
 
The management of speciﬁc local resources
desired by the central state – oil, gas, mineral
deposits, ﬁshing zones, strategic bases, tourism
potential, or sheer political loyalty – can be, and
has been, used as leverage for extracting some
degree of policy autonomy.
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The Canadian Provinces of Alberta, New-
foundland & Labrador and British Columbia,
as well as the Shetland Islands in the UK, have
successfully negotiated some local powers
from the central state over critical dimensions
of their economy, largely in relation to juris-
diction over oil, gas and other subsoil
resources (Baldacchino and Milne, 2000: 234;
Cullen, 1990; Blackadder, 1998). The same,
however, cannot be said about the manage-
ment of the Newfoundland ﬁshing stocks
(Baldacchino and Milne, 2000: 233). North
Sea oil and gas has also led to some renegotia-
tion of the power balance between the Faroe
Islands and Denmark (Olafsson, 2000) and
between the Shetland Islands and the UK
(Blackadder, 1998). Svalbard (Spitzbergen) is
special with its bilateral treaty provisions over
mining access reached between Norway and
USSR/Russia.
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 Sakhalin Island, with its prized
oil resources, has its own governor; yet it is
not a Russian federal district.
Other islands have extended their economic
zones over tracts of sea many times larger
than their own land mass (Falklands). Still
other islands – like Hainan (China) or Batam
(Indonesia) – have beneﬁted economically by
being designated special economic zones (see
Chongyi and Goodman, 1997; Royle, 1997,
respectively). What needs to be researched is
whether such changes have been accompa-
nied by a measure of power transfer from core
to periphery.
Meanwhile, the contribution of islands to cul-
tural, environmental and biological diversity is
 Managing the hinterland beyond
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proportionately much greater than the size of
their territories or populations (e.g. Young,
1999: 253). Sixteen sites from 13 different
island regions in Europe have been included by
UNESCO on its World Heritage list.
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 Islands
which 
 
in toto
 
 are also World Heritage Sites –
like Rapa Nui or Galapagos – are run differently
from the ‘normal’, mainland provinces of Chile
and Ecuador, respectively.
 
Powers over access, particularly in relation to air 
and sea transportation
 
Transportation is often a triple problem of
choice, time and price for islanders. Generally
speaking, islanders know that transportation
options and frequencies decrease and verge
towards monopoly provision, transit times
increase and prices rise with increasing dis-
tance from mainland areas, and with decreas-
ing size of a speciﬁc island’s population
(Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions,
2002: 25–26). Archipelagic islands compound
these issues even further (Hamilton-Jones,
1992; Bayliss-Smith 
 
et al
 
., 1988). Difﬁculties
with transportation affect a whole range of
issues, including the viability of a tourism
industry, a manufacturing export strategy,
absence of economies of scale, as well as lim-
itations to emergency off-island health care
(Baldacchino and Milne, 2000: 234). Distance
means high cost for the transport of goods,
services and people, and effectively reduces
access to the metropole, even for those over-
seas areas where residents are citizens of a
European mother country (Connell and Aldrich,
1992: 33). An analysis of the population history
of the Irish Islands suggests a clear relationship
between levels of access and population
decline (Royle and Scott, 1996). Island trans-
portation is often in the hands of ‘governments’
(Royle, 2001: 113), but which, and at which
level, in a federal arrangement? The Åland
Islands’ control over its shipping registry and
the safeguarding of duty-free transactions on
Åland ships ﬂying the Åland ﬂag have been
crucial to the territory’s economy (Lindström,
2000). In contrast, Niue’s dependence on a
weekly Air Nauru service led to a below-
capacity operation for its ﬂedgling tourism
industry when that service was discontinued for
over two years (Milne, 1992: 568).
 
Powers over free movement of persons
 
Sub-national island jurisdictions usually come
along with small populations and a small land
area. Given that smallness increases the
disposition towards all round volatility (e.g.
Dommen, 1980; Easterly and Kraay, 2000), the
threats of depopulation or overpopulation loom
larger, as do the resulting impacts on labour
supply and demand, and on housing stock sur-
plus or shortages. Archipelagic island territories
must also contend with the additional dynamics
of internal migration and urbanisation. Acute
emigration (and, more infrequently immigra-
tion) are the safety valves readily available in
response to all-too-frequent demographic, real
estate or employment imbalances. ‘Overall, it
must simply be concluded that the problems of
human resource planning are particularly acute
in island micro-states’ (Connell, 1988a: 23).
Pitcairn Island is the extreme scenario of a ter-
ritory risking depopulation (Connell, 1988b).
Many small islanders from sub-national juris-
dictions look upon citizenship rights as a dou-
ble privilege: it is a condition which grants the
basis for property ownership and employment
on their own island, while providing them with
a passport for potential emigration and freedom
of access to the territory and labour markets of
the same metropolitan power. The citizens of
the UK’s overseas territories have enjoyed free
access to the UK since 1999 (a right hitherto
extended only to the citizens of the Falkland
Islands and Gibraltar); the citizens of Puerto
Rico enjoy free access to the USA; Lisbon
granted citizenship rights in Portugal to almost
all citizens of Macau before the transfer of that
territory to China in 1999. Island autonomies
with a special association with New Zealand –
Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau – had half of their
island-born population living in New Zealand
by the mid-1980s (Bertram, 1986). Indeed,
‘unconstrained migration’ to a mother country
– typically the former colonial power – is one
key beneﬁt of negotiating self-determination
without independence for small island territo-
ries (Connell, 1988a: 12).
But migration policy extends to non-locals,
too. Concurrently, other island populations
have become swollen with the inﬂux of foreign-
ers. In the Balearics, 90% of the population
increase in recent years has been due to immi-
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gration for the purpose of retirement or employ-
ment (Conference of Peripheral Maritime
Regions, 2002: 67). Territories like Åland,
Bermuda and Malta have adopted immigration
policies which favour a stream of limited
but wealthy immigrants.
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 Meanwhile, there
are downsides: temporary residents (tourists)
increase competition for local, scarce
resources. Many small islands receive annual
visitor numbers which are many times the size
of the local population (McElroy, 1998). Tem-
porary or permanent visitor inﬂux acts to raise
the price of housing, at times beyond the reach
of local islanders, causing political ripples.
 
Para-diplomacy
 
The devolution of representative power to insti-
tutions above or below the nation state has
taken on some momentum in recent years.
Notable among these is the increasing demand
for political power by cities and large urban
metropoles in a burgeoning knowledge econ-
omy. In Europe, the Committee of the Regions
within the EU is one such legitimate advisory
body. Such ‘para-diplomacy’ has involved sub-
national governments setting up ofﬁces in Brus-
sels or in other countries, within and outside the
EU. A component of such devolution ﬁnds
expression in the ﬂurry of international activity
by sub-national ‘authorities’. The Catalan gov-
ernment has been a recent striking example as
part of a wider process of recent and ongoing
transformation of the EU into a structure of
multi-level governance, defying those who,
within a sovereigntist mould, had only been
able to imagine that the future was a Europe of
nation states or a new country called Europe.
Another is the Canadian Province of Québec,
an active (non-sovereign state) member of the
Francophonie. The Riau Islands form the plank
of a Singaporean-Indonesian collaborative
effort to kickstart development projects by
creating jurisdictional enclaves, bolder than the
exclusive economic zones of earlier develop-
ment strategies. ‘De facto states’ in the inter-
national system – like the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus or the Tamil-controlled parts
of Sri Lanka (Tamil Eilam) – press for recognition
on the international stage, seeking to bypass
other regimes (Bahcheli 
 
et al
 
., 2004). Other pro-
ponents of para-diplomacy include Tatarstan in
Russia (Sharafutdinova, 2003), the German
Lander, and the Belgian region of Flanders
(Aldecoa and Keating, 1999). In the world
of island jurisdictions, para-diplomacy is one
of the advantages of autonomy without
sovereignty.
 
Discussion
 
These ﬁve capacities can be seen to form a
uniﬁed whole, being, like the MIRAB model,
the distinct strands of a broad strategy for secur-
ing unorthodox economic development: People
considerations affecting citizenship, residence
and employment rights (P); Resource manage-
ment (R); Overseas engagement and ultra-
national recognition (O); Finance (F) and
Transportation (T). The acronym in this case
spells PROFT, although assigning two letters to
‘Finance’ (FI) – just as ‘Migration’ is assigned
two letters (MI) in the MIRAB name – would
spell an actual word, and would be arguably
easier to remember than MIRAB: PROFIT
(Table 1).
PROFIT economies would therefore differ
from their MIRAB neighbours by being more
interested in: a shrewd immigration and
cyclical migration policy; engaging in tough
external negotiations concerning the use of
local mineral, natural, political and other
imaginative resources; securing and control-
ling viable means of transportation; and lur-
ing foreign direct investment via very low/no
tax regimes.
 
Table 1.
 
Characteristics of MIRAB and PROFIT economies
MIRAB economies PROFIT economies
Migration (out) Migration (in/out)
Remittances (high) Remittances (low/medium)
Aid (high) Aid (low/nil)
Bureaucracy (high) Bureaucracy (medium/high)
Resource management 
(low/nil)
Resource management 
(medium/high)
(Para-)Diplomacy (subsidy-
driven)
(Para-)Diplomacy 
(procedure-driven)
Finance management (low) Finance management 
(medium/high)
Transportation 
management (low)
Transportation management 
(medium/high)
Manufactures (low) Manufactures (medium)
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Rather than assume that the MIRAB model is
the fundamental destiny of small economies,
and that any departures from it constitute
exceptions or periods of dormancy, I would
rather conceptualise the state of affairs as a
dynamic continuum with two extreme posi-
tions, MIRAB representing one of these
extremes:
To what extent are the MIRAB and the
PROFIT syndromes similar and different? Can,
and if so, how, does an island community grad-
uate away from one syndrome towards the
other? Is tourism one of the devices to escape
the MIRAB mould?
Certainly, both MIRAB and PROFIT models
constitute approaches towards managing the
hinterland beyond via primarily non-agricul-
tural, non-manufacturing, non-industrialisation
and non-commodity production strategies. Both
MIRAB and PROFIT economies are likely to
exhibit ‘bureaucratic dominance’ (Watters,
1987: 50) given structural diseconomies of
scale. Both are likely to depend substantially on
‘rent income’ which accrues by virtue of iden-
tity and location (Bertram and Watters, 1985:
510). But one approach can ride piggy back on
the other: in effect, a successful proactive pro-
duction strategy for small island economies lies
in the ‘marketing of identity’ (Fairbairn, 1988:
75; Baldacchino, 1999, 2002) for what are
typically more expensive, craft-based, lower-
technology manufactures.
Second, the contrast between some features
of the two models can be construed as differ-
ences of degree rather than kind. When it comes
to remittances, migration or a bureaucracy,
clearly all contemporary societies are going to
have elements of all three at any time; and so
the dependence on any of these three sectors
for economic purposes becomes a relativistic
one.
Third, one key difference between MIRAB
and PROFIT lies in the priority given to substan-
tive as against procedural interests. The ﬁrst –
when successful – is an end in itself, the second
is a means to a further end. The ﬁrst relegates
the MIRAB territory to a regime of subsidy, of
aid with dignity, of consumer-led growth with-
MIRAB PROFIT
 
out development, of seeking the responsibility
for economic beneﬁts in exogenous, extra-
territorial policy fora. The second – when suc-
cessful – is a jurisdictional or constitutional tool,
an endogenous instrument for public policy
which local ‘governing wits’ (Warrington, 1998:
105) can usually transform into economic pros-
perity. Attitude matters.
Fourth, it is possible for features of the MIRAB
and PROFIT economies to coexist. Indeed, at
any point in time, most economies are likely to
exhibit elements of both dispositions, especially
if they both prove to be responses to windows
of opportunity. Where choices are and can be
made between one strategy and another, then,
just like other economic decisions, the disposi-
tion to seek one road to largesse rather than
another would depend largely on opportunity
costs, track records of success, lower perceived
effort, lower perceived risk, or higher perceived
gain, just like any standard utility curve
transaction.
Fifth, it is practical to assume that, at a number
of points in time, an economy may undergo a
lurch from a MIRAB towards a PROFIT society,
or vice versa. The collapse of civil law and
governance structures in the Solomon Islands,
the exhaustion of the phospate mines and the
mismanagement of their previous accumulated
revenue in Nauru, the landfall of a hurricane or
any other major environmental disaster – such
occasions are likely to nudge small economies,
steadily or suddenly, along the MIRAB path, for
better or for worse, for a temporary period or an
interminably long one. The opposite lurch is also
likely. Watters (1987: 33) is self-critical enough
to identify what he calls ‘exceptions’ to the
MIRAB pattern among the ﬁve prototype island
economies which were documented in the pio-
neering 1985 article: the temporary citrus boom
and the stimulus of a state-promoted cannery in
the Cook Islands; the high-level export of phos-
phates until their exhaustion in 1979 in Kiribati.
Meanwhile, pearl-farming in French Polyne-
sia appeared to be reducing dependence on
‘geo-strategic rents’ and shifting its economy
towards a PROFIT direction (Poirine, 1998: 97);
aid per capita had fallen by more than 50% in
real terms between 1992 and 1997 (Poirine,
1998). Even on small and remote Pitcairn, a
historic decision appears to have been taken to
allow a consortium to build a tourist resort plus
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 In
spite of powerful vested interests of entrenched
politico-economic elites, one can contemplate
a ‘post-MIRAB economy’ (Treadgold, 1999:
236), as also suggested for Guam and Hawaii
(Poirine, 1998).
Sixth, one needs to appraise the impact of
tourism on both MIRAB and PROFIT econo-
mies. Tourism comes along with ‘genuine
comparative advantages’ for island microstates
(Connell, 1991: 265). Treadgold (1999) has
argued that tourism has helped to break Norfolk
Island, a previously classic MIRAB case, out of
this structural mould. Tourism has now ‘erased’
Norfolk island’s MIRAB characteristics or ren-
dered them insigniﬁcant, it is claimed. How-
ever, tourism is in itself a rent-accruing activity
bearing its own ‘geo-strategic’ (that is sun, sea,
salt, sand – and sex?) services which hardly vest
jurisdictional muscle to the provider; the indus-
try remains ﬁckle and vulnerable, mainly to
economic uncertainty and both local and
regional political instability. It is also a largely
private sector activity lying outside of ‘man-
aged’ external relationship syndromes. Or is it?
Perhaps tourism can be seen as part of a ‘hin-
terland management’ system if it is driven by
special concessions from metropolitan powers
or else beneﬁts handsomely from tourists from
the same metropolitan sites.
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Seventh, it would be useful to ﬁnd quantitative
indicators which correspond to the PROFIT syn-
drome, much like the visually evocative analysis
of the ‘jaws effect’ (imports outpacing exports;
expenditure outpacing revenue) (Bertram and
Watters, 1985: 510) for the MIRAB model. Per-
haps, as with the Bertram and Watters’ pioneer-
ing research of 20 years ago, one needs to
identify a clutch of PROFIT economies – some
sovereign states, some sub-national autonomous
units – and soberly analyse their economic sta-
tistics, migratory patterns, public sector ﬁnancial
health and, in the outcome, seek to distil some
comparative patterns. Likely candidates for this
exercise would include Åland, Aruba, Bermuda,
Cyprus, Iceland, Malta and Seychelles.
 
Conclusion: Merodia
 
The archipelago of Merodia, population
200 000, is a region of the republic of Lagado,
a member state of the enlarged European
Union. . . . (Conference of Peripheral Maritime
Regions, 2002)
 
It would only be an act of historical continu-
ity to resort to imaginary islands for didactic
purposes. Jonathan Swift created Lilliput to sat-
irise British high society; Daniel Defoe invented
Robinson Crusoe and his island to present an
account of the development of capitalism
(Hymer, 1971); Jules Verne’s 
 
Mysterious Island
 
demonstrates humankind’s superiority over
nature in the epoch of industrialism (Loxley,
1990); the island in Shakespeare’s 
 
The Tempest
 
is the setting for the critique of ethnicity and
colonialism (Brinklow 
 
et al.,
 
 2000).
The smaller the territory and the smaller the
resident population, the more likely is it for that
territory and that population to rely on external
inputs for sheer survival. The ﬁctitious Merodia
is one recent attempt at mulling and moralising
over the role of external support for island
development. It seeks to demonstrate how a
‘European islands policy combining under-
standing, ﬂexibility and solidarity with regard to
these [that is, island] regions leads to their full
integration within the [European] Union’ (Con-
ference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, 2002:
129). Furthermore, the implications of such a
policy would ‘. . . affect Europe as a whole’
(Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions,
2002). Merodia becomes the contemporary
experiment – and whether the outcome is a
utopia or dystopia is seen to depend on ‘man-
aging the hinterland’. The ‘permanent and per-
vasive realities’ of islands call for differential
treatment (Conference of Peripheral Maritime
Regions, 2002). The MIRAB syndrome, as much
a series of economic transactions as an ‘in-its-
own-way’ sustainable cultural lifestyle, is cer-
tainly one response towards the recognition of
this special handling.
But there are other responses beyond MIRAB.
Size of land area, population levels, regional
location or political status do not appear to pre-
empt the consideration of non-MIRAB options,
and allow for even messier ‘mix and match’
approaches. That is why the MIRAB model, the
PROFIT model, or any other model for that mat-
ter is best seen as an abstract, ideal type: seduc-
tively elegant in its conceptual simplicity, but
not present in its pure form anywhere in the real
world (after Weber, 1949: 89–95).
 Managing the hinterland beyond
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Notes
 
1 See also: http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/tiempo/
issue10/characts.htm (Accessed 31 July 2004).
2 A case in point: The inhabitants of Prince Edward
Island often complain because theirs is the most
densely populated province in Canada – with just 24
persons per square kilometre!
3 A search for the keywords ‘MIRAB’ and ‘Island’ using
Google search engine landed 442 hits on 5 December
2003 and 466 hits on 8 February 2004.
4 A case in point: Developing Batam Island as an exclu-
sive economic zone within Indonesia, exploiting its
proximity to Singapore, was a unilateral decision of
Jakarta and intensiﬁed the powerlessness of the
Batanese. See (Royle, 1997).
5 In the run-up to eventual independence, both Malta
and Mauritius ﬁrst sought integration with Britain.
6 Http://www.lowtax.net (Accessed 31 July 2004).
7 Such cases include: the issue of oil and gas reserves in
the discussions over the potential secession of the
Faroe Islands from the Danish realm, as well as on the
status of the Falkland Islands (because of oil); the grant-
ing by Westminster of special tax-raising powers
related to North Sea oil/gas to the Shetland Islands; the
British Virgin Islands and Bermuda (because of offshore
banking) under the British Crown; India’s relationship
with the Andaman and Nicobar Islands – seen as hav-
ing strong tourism potential; the use of Kwalajein Atoll
by the US Military within a Compact of Free Associa-
tion between the Marshall Islands and the USA. The
cultivation of political loyalty explains most of Gozo’s
administrative autonomy within the Maltese state.
Cullen (1990) explores the different ways in which
Australia and Canada handled the management of nat-
ural resources within their sub-national jurisdictions.
8 I am grateful to Iain Orr for this information (e-mail
communication dated 19 September 2003).
9 The UNESCO World Heritage List is available at:
http://whc.unesco.org/heritage.htm (Accessed 31 July
2004).
10 For example, foreigners in Bermuda are more or less
unable to buy land or property, other than houses with
an annual rental value in excess of US$43 800, equiv-
alent to a sale price of US$500 000 approx. Currently,
only 312 houses qualify. Visit: http://www.lowtax.net/
lowtax/html/bermuda/jbrres.html (Accessed 31 July
2004). In 2002, Malta successfully negotiated a land-
mark permanent derogation with the European
Commission preventing non-Maltese, non-resident EU
citizens from buying property in Malta (The Economist,
2004). Prevention of purchase of property by non-
Ålanders in Åland is also a safeguard in Finland’s Treaty
of Accession to the EU in 1995.
11 Http://www.ageofconsent.com/pitcairn.htm (Accessed
31 July 2004).
12 I wish to thank Harvey Armstrong for these insights.
He has suggested the acronym PROFITT, the second
‘T’ standing for Tourism. Private communication, dated
3 March 2004. While I am honoured that the PROFIT
acronym is already inviting hybrids (as MIRAB has
been doing), this speciﬁc matter is one that calls for
further research.
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